ABSTRACT Trusted computing architecture ensures the behavior of software that runs on a user machine by protecting software-level attacks. Due to the potential of exposing a user's private information while accessing a system, many studies have focused on analyzing existing protocols to develop new methods based on biometrics or additional devices to add new layers of security to the authentication process. For a few years, the idea of utilizing the combination of something you know with something you have and a personal authentication device (PAD) has become common in verification protocols. Very recently, a more secure PAD, namely the Offline Personal Authentication Device (OffPAD), was invented to improve the authentication process. This single device can be used to manage the identities of both users and service providers as well as support the authentication process, while being offline most of the time. In this paper, a rigorous vulnerability analysis for OffPAD-based authentication techniques is conducted using an attack tree analysis. Finally, to overcome the vulnerabilities, mitigation techniques are proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trusted computing (TC) refers to a cluster of ideas, technologies and applications for resolving computer security problems. It ensures that different parts of the system are behaving as expected. This improves the overall trustworthiness, privacy and security of hardware and software [36] and allows applications to communicate securely with servers and other applications. TC can be achieved through software modifications and hardware enhancements. In PC hardware, encryption keys are built that can be used to verify its identity and integrity. The operating system guarantees the application software's character and integrity by communicating with remote servers securely. To achieve secure operations, hardware-based cryptographic keys are used, which are generated and stored in the hardware manufacturing process. The design of this hardware is so sophisticated that it is not possible to retrieve the key by any method (i.e. reverse engineering). This core is never exposed to any other componenteven to the owner. Many applications use the concept of TC, for example, digital rights management, different platform authentication, preventing cheating in multiplayer games, distributed firewalls, third-party computing, improving reputation reckoning and data security and privacy [40] .
Authentication is an essential security service and a critical method for determining whether an individual is who s/he claims to be. It is usually based on a username and password, with supporting hardware, which can improve a service's security. Therefore, authentication is considered to be a significant issue for online service access. As authentication is necessary for individuals to guarantee that their accounts are secure and their information is not exposed to everyone, it is also essential for organizations to have an authentication method in their information systems. In general, there are many reasons why organizations should implement user authentication besides security reasons, including monitoring system activities, filtering incoming and outgoing content to configure role sets and policies and managing time allowances by specifying the total duration of system access for each user.
Acknowledged authentication factors have been placed into three categories, each of which may contain a range of elements used to verify and authenticate the identity of an individual. The classes are as follows: first, knowledge factors (what a user knows), for example, the password; second, ownership factors (what the user has), for example, an ID card; and third, inherent factors (who the user is), such as fingerprint data. A more useful approach is to combine two or more authenticator factors to gain benefits in security, convenience or both; for example, an ATM requires a bank card and a PIN. The bankcard is an example of something a user has and the PIN is an example of something a user knows. In this case, to represent this scenario, the preferred term is two-factor authentication [3] - [7] .
Because of the vulnerability of standard passwords, it is critical to manage them appropriately and it is essential to have a high level of certainty when identifying and authenticating users. Further control efforts are needed, but, with large systems, this may prove difficult. Fortunately, there is a more straightforward solution for adding a second layer of security to user logins and transactions that can be granted using multi-factor authentication. This solution works by involving two or more different factor criteria [8] - [10] .
Online service access usually uses a combination of static passwords and hardware devices, which dynamically generate access credentials. This approach requires that the user has many tools for each transaction and more passwords than s/he can memorize. To manage this situation, the personal authentication device (PAD) was proposed; the PAD can be used for user authentication for every online service, in addition to providing a series of other security services. By using the PAD as an identity manager, the user can be authenticated by every supported service automatically. The authentication process can be achieved by passing replay-protected challenge-response communication between the PAD and remote servers [11] - [15] .
Varmedal et al. [1] proposed an advanced PAD, called the Offline Personal Authentication Device (OffPAD), which provides authentication and identity management for both user and service provider. The main advantage of the OffPAD is that it is more secure than a standard PAD; by being offline most of the time and including safe components, OffPAD can defend its content and user privacy.
In this paper, the mitigation techniques for protecting the vulnerabilities of OffPAD-based authentication solution has been proposed, which is the extended version of their previous work [37] . The limitation of the proposed technique is that it is not studied the implementation of the solution in a hostile environment.
A. REVIEW OF THE OffPAD
Using two-factor authentication is an authentication category that combines something a user knows with something a user has, as with a bank account security token. A more advanced device that can be used for multiple systems at the same time is the PAD, which can provide security, privacy and multi-service authentication using just one device.
Varmedal et al. [1] also proposed a new, more secure version of the PAD, called the OffPAD. This new version supports the management and authentication of both service provider and user identities. The primary goal of this device is to provide the user with tools for securely managing the authentication processes for online transactions, by avoiding man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks while managing online identifications. Franks et al. [2] first published details of the PAD in 2005. Then, in 2013, the OffPAD was proposed by Varmedal et al.
The authentication process can be achieved by passing replay-protected challenge-response messages among the PAD and isolated servers; the OffPAD never exposes the password to the client terminal and remains online for brief periods only. Thus, the devices are minimally exposed to the distant server through the operator's computer. Therefore, the OffPAD can be used as:
1. A password/identity management system, controlling the end user's identifications for several services.
2.
A service authenticator that can be used by a company, by which the user is validated once for each session, whether by PIN or similar. 3. A transaction signature, used by the user to sign data electronically. By using the PAD as a user identity manager, authentication can be achieved automatically by every supported service.
B. USING AN OffPAD TO MANAGE AND AUTHENTICATE A USER
Usually, a password is either entered by a user or decrypted by a password manager to access systems, but in this traditional scenario, the password is vulnerable to attacks; it is exposed to the computer memory, which means threats to authentication. By contrast, the OffPAD uses the HTTP Digest Access Authentication (DAA) system identified as a portion of the HTTP standard in [3] . It uses a hash function to store the user's identifications on both the server and the OffPAD. The authentication scenario is as follows: a. The session starts with the client sending a request for a sheltered resource. b. The server sends the response with an verification test. c. The authentication challenge is muddled with the client identification and sent to the server by the client. d. The similar test response counts are done locally by the server, which afterward associates the outcome with the response. Once the examination is completed successfully, the client is allowed access to the asset. This situation is shown in Figure 1 .
II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH
By exploiting the unrevealed vulnerabilities in existing authentication protocols, an attacker can gain a considerable amount of illegal benefits. Therefore, many studies have focused on the analysis of existing protocols to develop new methods that add more layers of security, either based on biometrics or using extra devices. Based on this, we conducted a rigorous literature review on the existing protocols with a detailed classification and the taxonomy is provided in Fig. 2 .
A. CLASSIFICATION BASED ON AUTHENTICATION ANALYSIS 1) ANALYSIS OF WIRELESS AUTHENTICATION
Antonysamy and Patro [4] highlighted the ''challenges and possibilities of antenna design for the multipurpose wireless authentication device,'' which includes the interface, control of the internal devices, product certification issues and interference with other wireless technologies.
2) AUTHENTICATION SETS TO ANALYZE SECURITY ISSUES
To examine the security of a secure multimedia authentication scheme, [5] 3) ANALYSIS OF VERIFICATION SYSTEMS FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS [6] Seven operator verification systems for wireless sensor networks against 22 features were evaluated by [7] . They aimed to introduce the importance of developing new verification systems that take into account all the elements discussed, which can then provide a set of guidelines for future schemes proposed in the research. From their evaluation, they realized many things: first, the failure of all existing schemes to protect against gateway node bypassing attacks, node capture attacks and user impersonation attacks; second, that mutual authentication that resists denial-of-service attacks is provided by only one scheme.
4) ANALYSIS OF THE PAIRHAND PROTOCOL
Reference [8] analyzed a recently proposed handover authentication protocol, PairHand, to discover its vulnerability. They identified a threat to a compromised session key and tried to compromise it through a simple modification of the protocol, without losing any features. PairHand is very efficient in terms of computational complexity and communication, because of its features of shared verification and essential formation; only two handshakes are needed in between MN and AP, with no requirement to transmit any verification certificate as is done in traditional public key cryptosystems [9] .
5) ANALYSIS OF Li-Hwang's PROTOCOL
Reference [10] investigated Li-Hwang's biometrics-based distant operator verification system by utilizing smart cards and discovered some configuration defects. In the login and confirmation stages, they found that the framework superfluously includes additional correspondence and calculation. Second, during the password change phase, there was no verification of the old password in the scheme, even if the user entered his old password incorrectly by mistake; updating the new password would take place mistakenly. Finally, they discovered a flaw in the biometric checking hash; when the biometrics information was noisy, the cryptographic hash capacity could not be clearly connected. With the specific goal of overcoming these defects, he proposed changes to the plan.
6) ANALYSIS OF THE CPN (COLORED PETRI NET) PROTOCOL
To protect trusted platform module objects from unauthorized access, some alternatives have used an object-specific authorization protocol (OSAP) or session key authorization protocol (SKAP). By using this situation as a case study, [11] examined the security analysis value of CPNs to demonstrate their applicability as a common device for modeling and analyzing safety procedures. By including error handling and the recovery of many parts of the model, error discovery was improved. This proposed method is done by examining the OSAP to enhance the SKAP.
7) ANALYSIS OF THE AKA PROTOCOL
The first computational security analysis of both the LTE AKA and the UMTS AKA was by [12] . They found a vulnerability that both inside and outside attackers could exploit. An inside attacker might be authenticated as another owner subscribed to a helping network and use wireless facilities on the owner's behalf, while an outside attacker might defeat the entity authentication of the user to the serving networks. They also investigated the vulnerabilities of the stipulations of the UMTS and LTE AKA (and GSM IA) protocols [12] . Since they all use the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, both outside and inside attackers could take advantage of this flaw, by using the computationally proven CryptoVerif to violate the entity authentication properties.
8) ANALYSIS OF A ''MORE EFFICIENT AND SECURE DYNAMIC ID-BASED REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME''
The authors of a ''more efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme'' declared that their scheme preserves client secrecy, but [13] suggested that it does not. During authentication, the user cannot choose his/her password, which makes him/her vulnerable to insider attacks. Hence, the scheme is not feasible for real-life implementation.
9) ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK CONNECT
The method in [14] warned of attacks on the authentication protocol of Facebook Connect, detected by analyzing the HLPSL formalization presented when using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA). Facebook platforms offer a single sign-in service that allows users to log in to affiliated sites. The authors exposed two security weaknesses; correctly, that the Facebook Connect verification procedure is adhered to repetition attacks and masquerade attacks.
10) ADDRESSING THE VULNERABILITIES OF LOGIN CREDENTIALS BY ANALYZING CHARACTERISTICS
Reference [15] tried to address the vulnerabilities of login credentials by analyzing the characteristics of login credential usage and found that the number of subscriber accounts was considerably more significant than previously expected. They also found that many users used the same login credential information as each other.
11) ANALYSIS OF RFID
Li and Deng [16] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for RFID. Li and Deng (2007) analyzed the security vulnerabilities of this new protocol and found two potential attacks against it: a DE synchronization attack and a full disclosure attack. This work [17] was based on tripartite credibility to present a secure mechanism and enhance the security of LLRP and a third-party authentication system. It has two steps: first to describe the relevant information about the design of RFID and then to evaluate its performance based on storing difficulty, expense on communication and computational cost as well as to analyze the safety rewards compared with those of earlier research.
12) ANALYSIS OF TRMA+
To enhance the Class-1 and Generation-2 standard of RFID which is described in [18] , Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a new version of the TRMA scheme (TRMA+). However, they showed that this new version still contains severe security defects [19] . It is easy to recover 32-bit access and destroy passwords for a tag under the TRMA+ scheme by the attacker [20] .
B. ONE-FACTOR PROTOCOLS 1) MULTI-LEVEL PASSWORD GENERATION
In this work, Dinesha and Agrawal [21] suggested a method of accessing a cloud service that involves generating the password at many levels across the organization, which provides strict authentication and authorization. Their technique contains two separate objects: first, to ensure the cloud services, they have a cloud service provider; and second, they have an authenticated client organization for those accessing the cloud service. Authentication activities can be applied at the agency, team and user levels.
2) STAGGERED TESLA Li and Trappe [22] established staggered timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) as new a multigrade multicast authentication scheme used when creating the MACs for authenticating a packet, by employing staggered and multiple authentication keys. Their method is useful to compromise the effects of DoS attacks by using multi-grade authentication in multicast scenarios and enhances the filter forged multicast packets by reducing the delay. 
3) AKA
Huang and Li [3] proposed a one-pass authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol that avoids the existing efficiency problem. In this work [23] , a smart car-based user AKA security protocol is developed for the Telecare Medical Information System with the help of a cryptographic one-way hash function and the results are simulated by using the AVISPA tool. The outcome of the experiment is secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
C. MULTI-FACTOR PROTOCOLS 1) USING BIOMETRICS
In the following subsections, the multifactor biometric-based protocols are described.
a: ONE-TIME BIOMETRICS
Plateaux et al. [24] proposed a new authentication protocol for online banking and electronic payment systems called one-time biometrics. Their protocol involves two main components: the OffPAD, which ensures security and privacy, and a supporting biometrics algorithm. The protocol demonstrates outstanding performance when applied to three levels of fingerprint databases, and has great properties for safety and protection issues. A challenge-based procedure is then planned to stop replay attacks. The study focused on making online banking transaction authentication more robust by analyzing how to use biometrics with user authentication.
b: OPTICAL DEVICE FOR FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION
Sano et al. [25] proposed a device that supports a new fingerprint algorithm. This new device considers the optical characteristics of the finger to form an image of the fingerprint pattern. The user's prints provide secure authentication and are not affected by changes in the state of the finger or operating environment. The device can also sense false fingerprints that are made from jelly or other materials.
c: ROBUST MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION FOR FRAGILE COMMUNICATIONS
Reference [26] proposed two solutions for verification in unstable communication surroundings. The first solution is a protocol based on using passwords, smart cards and biometrics, which provides a promising verification explanation in slow-connection circumstances called multi-factor authentication protocols. The second solution is stand-alone authentication, which allows users to be adequately authenticated regardless of the status of their connection to the remote authentication server. VOLUME 6, 2018
2) USING AN EXTRA DEVICE a: OffPAD
The OffPAD aims to provide the user with tools for securely managing the authentication processes for online transactions, by avoiding man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks and managing online identifications at the same time. Jøsang and Pope first published details of the PAD in 2005 [2] . Then, in 2013, [1] proposed an improved version of the PAD: the OffPAD. To protect user privacy and device contents, it is intended to remain offline most of the time and contains a secure element.
b: REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME USING SMART CARDS
Another study [27] suggested using a smart card to support operator verification, grounded on ElGamal's public key cryptosystem. The card's security trusts on the effort of calculating discrete logarithms above finite fields. This is a system of remote user authentication without a password verification table; the user applies to the registration center and is issued with a smart card with a password. After this, when the authorized user wants to log in, s/he inserts the card into the login device along with his/her ID and password.
c: MASPA
Reference [28] discussed a mobile architecture for strong personal authentication (MASPA), which uses hash functions, symmetric and asymmetric encryption (a three-pass DiffieHellman variant) and cryptographic primitives including digital signatures in its authentication algorithm.
d: FIDO
Reference [29] attempted to provide an authentication mechanism (FIDO) that reduces reliance on passwords. The new verification structure intends to give a favorable split between local-user-to-authenticator authentication and authenticatorto-reliant-party authentication; trusted parties can utilize the new client verification strategies without changing the serverside infrastructure.
e: MMR
Although mobile multi-hop relay (MMR) is a self-organizing and self-healing network, due to its nature, it is vulnerable to security threats. In [30] , a centralized authentication and key distribution algorithm were discussed for MMR.
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS FOR AUTHENTICATING A USER BY USING THE OffPAD

A. POSSIBLE VULNERABILITIES OF SINGLE-AND MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
This section outlines some of the ways in which protocols may fail to meet their goals. The partial investigation of vulnerabilities, concerning an attack tree of existing singleand multi-factor authentication protocols such as AKA, MMR and TESLA [12] , [19] , [22] , [31] , [32] is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Ming et al. investigated AKA and found that it was vulnerable to man-in-the-middle, session hijacking and server spoofing attacks, among others [12] . Additionally, it found vulnerability that both inside and outside attackers could exploit. TESLA aims to have an efficient protocol to minimize the communication and computation overheads, but it is still vulnerable to DoS attacks and delayed packets.
B. THREATS AND ATTACKS WHEN USING THE HTTP DAA PROTOCOL WITH THE OffPAD
As previously discussed, Klevjer et al. proposed an improvement to password authentication with the OffPAD, which uses an HTTP DAA scheme identified as a part of the HTTP standard [3] . DAA is a web server method that can be used to verify both parties to a communication. The main idea behind DAA is to apply a cryptographic hash on the user credentials to produce the message digest, which is then sent over the communication network. One example is online banking transactions.
DAA was first announced by RFC 2069, which is an Extension to HTTP: DAA. DAA uses a server generated nonce to add security to the traditional digest authentication scheme. Optional security improvements to DAA were introduced, replacing RFC 2069 with RFC 2617 (HTTP Authentication: Basic and DAA) [33] .
The security choices in RFC 2617 are discretionary; if the server does not specify the security options, then the user may work in the less-secure RF 2069 mode. In this section, we discuss the attacks that can be caused by using the HTTP DAA protocol to authenticate users aligned with the OffPAD. We discovered two attacks.
1) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS
Using DAA made the authentication process vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. While DAA does not provide any mechanism to verify the server's identity for clients, the intruder can fool the client by impersonating the server and asking to use the legacy RFC 2069 DAA mode that does not support the optional security enhancements.
A man-in-the-middle attack could occur when a weak authentication scheme is added to the user options by the intruder, which may reveal the client's identifications. Therefore, the client should be aware and always select the most reliable scheme from the selections offered [2] .
2) REPLAY ATTACKS
The DAA security option enhances basic authentication and makes it safer against eavesdropping attacks, but it is still vulnerable to replay attacks.
If the server only supports the nonce, the intruder can eavesdrop on a message or message components from a previous session and replay it as a new message to establish a new course [34] . Even the user credentials are hashed and sent to the server as a digest. The intruder can use this compendium without knowing the password by capturing it and replaying it to the server to establish a new session. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This section discusses a mitigation technique for man-in-themiddle and replay attacks and then suggests principles to guide the design of further secure authentication schemes. The complete procedure is displayed in the Figure 4 and the details are listed in the steps below:
1. The client and server contact a third-party certificate authority to sign a certificate that binds identity to a public key. 2. When secret recourse is requested, the client and server exchange their certificates to verify each other's identity. At this point, the verification phase ends. This helps maintain the session against a man-in-the-middle attack. 3. The server then sends a Challenge, which contains an authentication challenge along with a nonce and time stamp. 4. The client computes the session key K S = Hash (authentication Challenge || nonce || time stamp), and then sends it back to the server as a response. This is the reply of the challenge of the server from the client side and the part of the challenge-response mutual authentication. 5. The server computes the session key K S and compares it with the one received from the client. This is the verification of the response at the server side.
6. If the computation is equal, then access is granted; thus the challenge-response authentication successes. As a conclusion, we present some proposed solutions to mitigate each attack.
A. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS
This attack can occur by adding a weak authentication scheme such as the RFC 2069 DAA mode that does not support the optional security enhancements to the set of options, expecting that the user will select this scheme, which can expose his or her cardinal.
For this reason, we suggest possible solutions against this attack. First, the client should be aware and always select the most reliable scheme that s/he knows from the selections presented. Second, for high-risk and high-security systems that require these guarantees, the user has to turn to Secure Socket Layout (SSL). SSL is a transporting layer security, where the client and server exchange PKI certificates before establishing a session; these certificates are issued and verified by a third party, which should be a standard certificate authority [2] .
B. REPLAY ATTACKS
To prevent replay attacks, the server can pass a dynamic token called a server-specified nonce to the client, which is changed frequently [33] . The client attaches this nonce token to the VOLUME 6, 2018 password before computing the digest and it can be used as a password salting. Mixing the nonce in the password by concatenating it causes the summary to change each time the nonce changes. Thus, the replay attack is prevented [35] .
C. COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATIONAL COST
The protocol has five interactive handshake communications between the sender and the receiver for mutual authentication with the standard certificate and TCP/IP packets. On top that the protocol needs to compute, two concatenation operations and two hash functions computation.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, first, the implementation using a security tool for the formal verification of the proposed protocol is discussed. In the next subsection, an analysis is provided.
A. AVISPA: A VERIFICATION TOOL FOR FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
AVISPA is considered to be one among the most reliable, programmed official secured, verified and analysis tools for secure communication protocols. It has the capability of verifying whether or not the security protocol is secure and is capable of displaying every possible attack and its traces in case it is not entirely secured. AVISPA, which is freely available, makes it easy to model any security protocol. It has an animated and instinctive language known as High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) to help the procedure writer and check the specification of the protocol. The basic idea about HLPSL has been derived from the semantic roots of Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions [38] . It also permits complex stream of designs and data structures and gets them exposed. Aslo, it displays the communication method happening between different agents with the help of the ''Alice-Bob'' notation. The language used to define the protocol is based on various roles and each role is played by an agent. Depending on the position assigned, each agent has to perform its task. The primary job assigned for the purpose is usually an event action-dependent transition: the moment an event happens; the agent has to act accordingly by moving itself from one state to another after the completion of a particular action. Furthermore, there is always a relation between an event or an action from any agent and an occasion or act from any of the lasting mediators; to be clear, when something is sent or received by the agent, there is continuously extra mediators who acts on it either as receiver or as sender depending on the action happened.
Additional kind of character is also available called the composed role. This role acts as an initiator; it helps modelling the whole protocol and generates a session with multiple agents. When this role executes the complete procedure, then it is named as the chief role or the atmosphere role. Once this role is described, there is a need to set the security goals in HLPSL. AVISPA is used to execute the protocol defined and modeled by HLPSL to verify its back-end to check its security goals. The well-known intruder model in [39] is used by AVISPA, which expects an intruder to interfere inside the network and take command of network traffic as much as possible, which helps in making the analysis. Moreover, it also helps define the knowledge of the intruder in the HLPSL model. 
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the formal verification of security analyses for the proposed solution is discussed. As mentioned previously, we use AVISPA for simulation and formal verification. To this end, the HLPSL and CAS+ models of our proposed solutions are presented, as they are an easy way in which to model a protocol characterized in the Alice-Bob notation, since this gives a perfect vision of the communication among the parties. The first proposed solution is represented in the AliceBob notation, as illustrated in Figure 5 . From the figure the steps are easily understandable, only step 3 and 5 need to discuss little-bit for better clarification. In step 3 the key has been computed and in step 5, the received and computed values has been compared.
The HLPSL Model For The Proposed Protocol: Using the Alice-Bob notation in Figure 5 , the automata format representation is depicted in Figures 6 and 7 , where the state tran- sitions are shown openly for all the essential roles (OffPAD, server). HLPSL works in the event action-based model, which is why ''event'' and ''action'' are attached with the transitions. Due to the scope limitations of the paper, a few important things are discussed here regarding the HLPSL model for the proposed protocol. The keyword ''RCV'' is used to receive a message from a sender and ''SND'' is used to send a message to a receiver. HLPSL has a default ''start'' state for the initiator to start the protocol. In our model, the OffPAD takes the initiative for the initial communication by sending a special signal ''SND(start).'' In HLPSL, it is assumed that the roles have some pre-computed shared knowledge to start the protocol. Based on this pre-computed shared understanding between the roles, the proposed protocol is executed in the HLPSL model. It is remarked by the AVISPA state transition that both of the roles are in a safe state. An intruder party cannot have enough knowledge to attack the protocol. VOLUME 6, 2018
VI. CONCLUSION
The target of this paper was to investigate the possible vulnerabilities of OffPAD-based solutions and provide mitigation techniques for these vulnerabilities. Many studies focus on the analysis of the potential to expose a user's privacy while accessing a system through an authentication process. By conducting a detailed classification and rigorous literature review on existing protocols, we showed the existence of different protocols that use extra devices or biometrics. Subsequently, we performed a partial investigation of the vulnerabilities in some actual data origin and entity authentication protocols, using an attack tree analysis. We realized that there are many forms of attacks that could threaten the privacy of the user through these protocols. concerning the previous sections, a vulnerability analysis for OffPAD-based solutions for user authentication was performed. As a consequence of our security analysis, we found that this authentication was vulnerable to attacks, specifically replay and man-inthe-middle attacks; therefore, to mitigate these attacks, new schemes were presented by using SSL and nonces to prevent them. As a future research, the implementation of the proposed solution can be studied in a hostile environment. MD SARWAR M HAQUE received the M.Sc. degree in computer systems and networking from the University of Greenwich, London, U.K. He is currently a Faculty Member with the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals. He has published a number of peer-reviewed publications. He is also involved in several research and development projects. His research interest includes Internet of Things, network security and privacy, data mining and machine learning techniques, performance analysis and simulation of computer and communication systems, and image processing.
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